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The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World:
A Flying Elephant
Stephen M. Feldmant
From there to here,
from here to there,
funny things
are everywhere.
Dr. Seuss'
I. DUMBO, THE FLYING ELEPHANT: AN
INTRODUCTION
Postmodern jurisprudents celebrate the multiplicity of tex-
tual meanings in legal documents. They relish the deconstruc-
tion of a previously accepted and supposedly authoritative tex-
tual interpretation. Supreme Court Justices, meanwhile, must
decide cases. They autocratically declare the law, deny ambi-
guities, and proclaim univocal conclusions. How, then, do the
Justices live in a postmodern world? The children's story of
Dumbo evokes one possible answer.
Dumbo, a baby circus elephant, is born with floppy ears so
outlandishly enormous that they become entangled in his feet
when he walks.2 The hapless Dumbo, defended only by his
loving mother, suffers as the constant butt of cruel jokes. Con-
demned as inadequate by the other circus elephants and then
even by the lowly clowns, poor Dumbo sinks into despair when
his mother is chained inside a cage for attacking a boy who had
t Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Tulsa; National
Endowment for the Humanities Fellow, 1998. I thank Larry CatA Backer,
Marty Belsky, Linda Lacey, Jay Mootz, Madeleine M. Plasencia, and Mark
Tushnet for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank those par-
ticipants from the listserver on Constitutional Law (conlaw@ssiinc.com) who
sent me their favorite strange Rehnquist Court quotations and references. Fi-
nally, I appreciate the financial support of the Faculty Summer Research
Grant Program of the University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. DR. SEUSS, ONE FISH, Two FISH, RED FISH, BLUE FISH 9 (1960).
2. DUMBO (Walt Disney 1941).
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tormented her baby. Dumbo's fortunes begin to change,
though, when he is befriended by the sympathetic Timothy
Mouse, who realizes that Dumbo can use his ears as wings to
fly. Timothy convinces the incredulous Dumbo, with much
coaxing, to hold a supposedly magic feather in his trunk and to
try flying. While Timothy sits on Dumbo's head, the little ele-
phant launches himself from a high cliff, and after a few mo-
ments of uncertainty, he spreads his ears and soars high into
the sky. The magic feather works! Or so Dumbo imagines-af-
ter all, he is flying.
Timothy then develops a plan for Dumbo to surprise every-
body at the circus with his astounding ability to fly. As part of
the plan, Dumbo climbs a high ladder inside the big top and
hurls himself into the air. Unfortunately, the magic feather
quickly slips from Dumbo's grasp. Convinced that he cannot fly
without his feather, Dumbo plunges into a free-fall. Timothy,
sitting on Dumbo's head, frantically struggles to persuade the
panic-stricken elephant that the feather was not magical after
all. As they near the ground, Dumbo finally spreads his ears
and desperately begins to flap. To the astonishment of the
crowd, the other performers, and himself, Dumbo sails up to
the top of the circus tent. The jubilant Dumbo now realizes
that the feather did nothing but assuage his doubts. All along,
despite his disbelief, Dumbo had the ability to fly.
The story of Dumbo can be understood as an allegory for
the movement from modernism to postmodernism in American
law. In brief, what is modernism? 3 Perhaps most important,
modernists are epistemological foundationalists. They believe
that knowledge ought to, and indeed must be, firmly grounded
on some objective foundation. Unlike the premodernists, how-
ever, modernists claim to reject religious, mythological, and
3. Some sources that helpfully discuss modernism include the following:
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST (1989); RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTiviSM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEU-
TICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
MODERN AGE (Robert M. Wallace trans., 1983) (2d rev. ed. 1976); LOUIS
DUPR, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY: AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF
NATURE AND CULTURE (1993); RITA FELSKI, THE GENDER OF MODERNITY
(1995); KARL LOWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY (1949); TED V. MCALLISTER,
REVOLT AGAINST MODERNITY (1996); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT (1975); RICHARD H. POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM FROM
ERASMUS TO SPINOZA (1979); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR
OF NATURE (1979); RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND
(1991); STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF
MODERNITY (1990); ERIC VOEGELN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1952).
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other traditional footings and instead search for some alterna-
tive foundation or Archimedean point. Most commonly, mod-
ernists turn to abstract reason or sense experience as the os-
tensibly objective sources of knowledge. Empiricists assert, for
example, that sense experience directly accesses or at least
mirrors the external world and firmly grounds claims to knowl-
edge of that world. Thus, for more than a century of American
legal thought, modernist jurisprudents have devoted them-
selves to a quest for the solid foundations of legal knowledge
that supposedly would support and constrain judicial decision-
making.4
This commitment to foundationalism leads many modern-
ists to be simultaneously earnest and anxious. Because mod-
ernists truly believe in their foundations, they constantly and
most earnestly invoke those foundations to support the objec-
tivity of their sundry pronouncements. A modernist, moreover,
does not believe that objectivity is limited to knowledge solely
of the epistemological foundation itself; rather, the foundation
can be built upon. With the appropriate tools or instruments
modernists can construct elaborate and even elegant systems of
knowledge. We might say that with the right equipment-that
is, a firm foundation and well-honed tools-a modernist be-
lieves that just about anything can be constructed. In law,
modernist scholars and attorneys constantly fashion legal ar-
guments by earnestly invoking lawyerly equipment such as
stare decisis, logical consistency, and original intent. When
properly used, this equipment supposedly leads to objective
conclusions. 5
At the same time, though, modernists use their founda-
tions and tools with anxiety. Anxiety arises for two reasons.
First, objectivity is very important to modernists. From their
standpoint, if we do not have a firm foundation for knowledge,
4. For discussions of American legal modernism, see Stephen M. Feld-
man, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought: The
Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIvE
324 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) [hereinafter Feldman, From Modernism],
and Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurispru-
dence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1997) (hereinafter
Feldman, The Onset].
5. See Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 329-44; Robert W.
Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and
Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2218 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). See generally Pierre Schlag,
Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997).
20001 675
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
then we are doomed-and "doomed" is the precise word here.
We are doomed to floating arbitrarily through the abyss, un-
tethered to the reassuring terra firma. We are doomed to ni-
hilism and relativism, the hobgoblins of modernist thought;
doomed to knowing nothing and having no legitimate ethical
values or, at best, having ethical values that are no better (or
worse) than any others. There would be no way to judge; no
way to know. Second, modernists earnestly believe in founda-
tions and tools, but not without constantly doubting their effi-
cacy. These foundations and tools might not deliver as prom-
ised-they might not bestow the much-desired objectivity. If
they do not deliver, then modernists will be forced to face their
worst fears of nihilism and relativism. Needless to say, all this
can produce a bit of anxiety.6
Nonetheless, from a postmodern frame of reference, the
various epistemological foundations of the modernists are like
Dumbo's magic feather.7 Modernists might feel good because
they believe in such foundations. The supposed existence of
foundations assuage modernist fears of their hobgoblins, but
the epistemological foundations are no more substantial than
the magic of Dumbo's feather. By contrast, postmodernists do
not fear the hobgoblins. Postmodernists instead assert that the
modernists' ostensible foundations give us nothing that we do
not already have: we can understand, communicate, and have
knowledge without the benefit of a firm foundation. We do it
all the time, and we have always done so. Quite simply, our
belief or disbelief in an epistemological foundation-a magic
feather-does not determine our ability to fly.8
6. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 16-20 (discussing the "Cartesian
Anxiety" in Western philosophy).
7. Some helpful sources focusing on postmodernism include the follow-
ing: ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS OF POSTMODERNITY (1992); STEVEN
CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989); FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER,
DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); DAVID
HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY (1990); ROBERT HOLLINGER,
POSTMODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1994); FREDRIC JAMESON,
POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991);
BARBARA KRUGER, REMOTE CONTROL: POWER, CULTURES, AND THE WORLD OF
APPEARANCES (1993); JEAN-FRANOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi
trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984); CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, WHAT'S WRONG
WITH POSTMODERNISM (1990); POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY (Roy Boyne &
All Rattansi eds., 1990).
8. For discussions of postmodern legal scholarship, see generally Ste-
phen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship
[Vol. 84:673
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Consequently, whereas modernists typically are earnest
yet anxious, postmodernists are ironic and playful.9 For exam-
ple, even though postmodern legal scholars are anti-
foundationalists-repudiating the modernist quest for founda-
tions-they nonetheless remain enmeshed within the struc-
tures of scholarly and lawyerly discourse, just like modernist
scholars. Postmodern professors, that is, teach classes and
publish articles and books. 10 In doing so, postmodernists must
construct narratives and arguments using the available rhe-
torical tools or modes of discourse. They must use both mod-
ernist and postmodernist concepts to present their views. But
whereas modernist scholars use these tools earnestly, postmod-
ernist scholars use them ironically, knowing that the tools can-
not perform as promised. The modernist tools, most important,
caimot deliver objectively grounded results. Yet for these
postmodernists, no other options exist. There are no other rhe-
torical or discursive devices that can be grasped. In this sense,
and Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New
Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1046 (1994) [hereinafter
Feldman, Diagnosing Power], Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power
and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Juris-
prudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243
(1993), Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the Pieces: Postmodernism in the
Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151 (1999) [hereinafter Feldman, Playing],
and Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 166 (1996) [hereinafter Feldman, Politics].
9. I will discuss the relationships among premodern, modem, and post-
modem legal thought more extensively in STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTU-
AL VOYAGE (forthcoming Mar. 2000).
10. For samples of postmodern legal scholarship, see generally DRUCILLA
CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (1991), STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY (1989); J.M. Balkin, What Is a Postmodern Constitutional-
ism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992), James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible?
The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991), An-
thony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-aged
President, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 250 (1989), Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and
the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989), Tracy E. Higgins, "By
Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1536 (1995), Robert Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitu-
tional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 317 (1994), Francis J. Mootz, III,
Postmodern Constitutionalism as Materialism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 515 (1992),
Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismlLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254
(1992), Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Impli-
cations for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992),
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990),
and Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the
Gaze, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 131.
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postmodern scholarship amounts to playing with the pieces, in-
cluding those fallen pieces that remain from deconstructed
modernist positions.11 Even so, while postmodernists might be
said to be playing with scholarly tools or pieces, such play is not
necessarily frivolous (though sometimes it can be); much post-
modern scholarship is politically and morally charged.12
In this Essay, I argue that the Supreme Court's recent ju-
risprudence manifests certain postmodern themes. The two
Justices leading this postmodern movement resemble Timothy
Mouse in the Dumbo story as he sat on Dumbo's head yelling,
"You can fly without the feather! You can fly without the
feather!" These two Justices are in the vanguard of postmod-
ernism. They are the avant-garde, the radical postmodernists.
Surprisingly, these two Justices are none other than those
leading judicial and political conservatives, Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia.
Now, I am not claiming that Rehnquist and Scalia are po-
litically radical. To the contrary, they are true political conser-
vatives. In fact, one Court observer has estimated that he
could accurately predict Rehnquist's vote in approximately
ninety percent of the cases by consulting "the platforms of the
Republican Party" rather than the Court's own case prece-
dents.13 As I will discuss, however, postmodernism is politi-
cally ambivalent, although it has potentially radical political
implications. Hence, Rehnquist's and Scalia's political conser-
vatism does not prevent them from being postmodernists, or at
11. See Feldman, Playing, supra note 8, at 151-52. Jean Baudrillard
writes: "All that remains to be done is to play with the pieces. Playing with
the pieces-that is post-modern." Id. at 151 (citing Jean Baudrillard, Game
With Vestiges, 5 ON BEACH 19, 24 (1984)).
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1997) (presenting a critical social narrative of the separation of church and
state). It is worth noting, moreover, that different postmodernists often use
the term "play" in different ways. See Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 185
& n.92 (distinguishing Gadamer's and Derrida's respective uses of the term
"play").
13. Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326,
1328 (1990); see Laura K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William
Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 568-69
(1996) (emphasizing Rehnquist's predictability). Tushnet acknowledges, how-
ever, that "much the same could be said of almost all of [Rehnquist's] col-
leagues, with the obvious changes in reference to the platform of the other
party in the appropriate cases." Tushnet, supra, at 1328. With regard to
Rehnquist, Sue Davis has argued otherwise. See SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 36-37, 204-05 (1989).
[Vol. 84:673
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least from endorsing or following certain postmodern themes.
Basically, they are sitting on Dumbo's head-or sitting on the
Supreme Court-and saying that the Court can continue de-
ciding cases and proclaiming law, just as it has always done be-
fore. The Court can do so even though these Justices realize
that all their traditional or modernist tools of judicial reasoning
do not work as advertised. The tools do not deliver objective
decisions any more than Dumbo's feather enabled him to fly.
In Part II of this Essay, I discuss how America went
through a dramatic transformation during the 1960s and
1970s. 14 During that time, the nation experienced a serious
cultural, political, and social fragmentation that left the osten-
sible consensus of the 1950s crumbled into debris. This loss of
consensus changed the legal academy in many ways, one of
which was to facilitate the hiring of an appreciable number of
women and persons of color for the first time in the annals of
American law schools. The changing demographic makeup of
the law professoriate then transformed legal scholarship by
contributing to the emergence of outsider jurisprudence and
postmodern legal theory.
Part III explores how this loss of consensus and the devel-
opment of postmodern culture has influenced Supreme Court
jurisprudence, particularly under Chief Justice Rehnquist.' 5 I
do not argue that the Justices have become avowed postmod-
ernists, but rather that, like everyone else in America, they live
within a postmodern culture. Consequently, postmodernism
has, in a sense, infused their judicial practice.
I conclude in Part IV with a discussion of the relations be-
tween the Supreme Court's brand of postmodern jurisprudence
and the Court's role as an authoritative pronouncer of law. 16
To be sure, the Court's practice of deciding cases will continue
regardless of the presence of certain postmodern themes in the
Justices' opinions. The Court will decide case after case-is-
suing decision after decision after decision ad infinitum-even
though the Justices may no longer believe that their decisions
rest on some firm legal foundation. In other words, the Jus-
tices will continue to decide, even though the magic feather has
fluttered from their grasp.
14. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 65-145 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSENSUS LOST
A. AMERICA FRAGMENTS
The United States in the 1950s and early 1960s was a na-
tion characterized by consensus and confidence. 17  Many
Americans, including most legal scholars and political theo-
rists, believed throughout the 1950s that the nation was united
in a celebration of democracy and the rule of law.18 Moreover,
they were confident that because of American know-how, pros-
perity, and power, democracy and the rule of law not only could
suffuse the lives of all Americans but also could beneficially
shape the entire world. 19 Yet, this period of consensus was,
perhaps, "a fool's paradise... a time of false complacency and
of hubristic and dangerous illusions."20 The early Civil Rights
Movement suggested the flaws in the idea of consensus, but
then widespread support for the Movement itself became part
of the consensus-reflecting ostensibly the American commit-
ments to liberty and equality.2 1 Moreover, the successes of the
early Movement only fueled American confidence: many Ameri-
cans believed that Southern racism could be defeated so that all
citizens would have an equal chance to share in the American
dream.22 This was indeed a time of "grand expectations."23 Ac-
cording to historian James T. Patterson, "[p]eople talked confi-
dently about winning 'wars' against contemporary problems,
17. Useful sources on American history, including jurisprudential and le-
gal history, include the following: NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994); GODFREY
HODGSON, AMERICA IN OUR TIME (1976); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-
INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1962); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS (1995); PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY
QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988); JAMES T.
PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 (1996);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1993); HOWARD
ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1980); Thomas Bender,
Politics, Intellect, and the American University, 1945-1995, 126 DAEDULUS 1
(1997); Robert W. Gordon, The Case For (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1231 (1995); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106
YALE L.J. 493 (1996).
18. See, e.g., HODGSON, supra note 17, at 67.
19. See, e.g., id. at 68.
20. Id. at 16.
21. See id. at 157.
22. See id. at 157-58.
23. PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 451.
[Vol. 84:673
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ranging from poverty to cancer to unrest in Vietnam. 2 4 Ulti-
mately, however, events from the early 1960s through the early
1970s would defeat these expectations, dramatically shattering
American perceptions of harmony and success. The transfor-
mation of the Civil Rights Movement, the assassinations of
President John F. Kennedy, his brother United States Senator
Robert F. Kennedy, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.,
the Vietnam War and its concomitant protests, and the Water-
gate Affair left Americans shaken with self-doubt and "tore
consensus to shreds."25
I would like to focus on the loss of consensus, in particular,
and its ramifications for legal thought. In terms of American
society in general, the fate of the Civil Rights Movement per-
haps best exemplifies the vanishing of consensus. For several
years, starting on December 1, 1955, with the refusal of Rosa
Parks to move to the back of the bus in Montgomery, Alabama,
the key organization in the Movement was the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference (SCLC), led by the Reverends Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, and Fred Shut-
tlesworth.26 The writings of King, in particular, reveal the
optimistic attitudes of the SCLC leaders, the sense that Afri-
can-Americans could become successfully integrated into a co-
hesive and egalitarian American community. Even though
King was, in his own words, "aware of the complexity of human
motives" and cognizant of "the glaring reality of collective evil,"
his unwavering commitment to nonviolent resistance demon-
strated his conviction in the potential for communal progress. 27
"[Olur aim is to persuade," King proclaimed. 28 "We adopt the
means of nonviolence because our end is a community at peace
with itself... We will always be willing to talk and seek fair
24. Id. at 452.
25. HODGSON, supra note 17, at 492.
26. See id. at 185.
27. Martin Luther King, Jr., Pilgrimage to Nonviolence, in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 35, 36
(James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE]. For a
historical overview of the Civil Rights Movement, see generally DAVID J.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986), and ROBERT
WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1990). See also ZINN, supra note 17, at 440-59.
28. Martin Luther King, Jr., An Address Before the National Press Club,
in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 27, at 99, 103. For a brief summary of
King's views, see Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the
Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1866-76 (1992).
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compromise, but we are ready to suffer when necessary.., to
become witnesses to the truth as we see it. ' 29
By the early 1960s, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) had emerged as another key organization
in the evolving Civil Rights Movement. SNCC was constituted
primarily of young people, including many college students,
who initially had participated in sit-ins at lunch counters.30
Most SNCC members "began as believers in the liberal creed,"
yet they "ended up rejecting the system."31 As historian God-
frey Hodgson explains, SNCC leaders "started out convinced of
the relevance of the Christian gospel, of the promise of Amer-
ica, and of the righteousness of the federal government. Fear,
pain, disappointment and betrayal changed them. They be-
came more pessimistic, more skeptical, more scoffing-and
more separatist. They lost faith in the political paradise."32
Ironically, by the time that King made his famed I Have A
Dream speech at the March on Washington in the summer of
1963, the dream already was fading. King spoke of "a dream
deeply rooted in the American dream that one day this nation
will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed-we hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal."33 Malcolm X retorted with a very different vision: "I
don't see any American dream, I see an American nightmare."34
To him, the March on Washington should have been called "the
farce on Washington" because, during the planning stages, the
Kennedy Administration had clandestinely but successfully
worked to de-radicalize it. 35 Partly because of Administration
pressure, the March focused on the enactment of civil rights
legislation rather than more incendiary issues, such as eco-
nomic injustice.36
29. King, supra note 28, at 103.
30. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 186-87.
31. Id. at 189.
32. Id.
33. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 27, at 219.
34. Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet, in MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23, 26
(George Breitman ed., 1965) (quoting from a talk given by Malcolm X in
Cleveland on April 3, 1964). On the relation between King and Malcolm X, see
generally JAMES H. CONE, MARTIN AND MALCOLM AND AMERICA (1991).
35. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 200.
36. See id. (quoting Malcolm X). For a discussion of the Kennedy Admini-
stration's role in the March, see id. at 157, 196-97; PATTERSON, supra note 17,
at 482-83; ZINN, supra note 17, at 448-49.
682 [Vol. 84:673
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In the two years after the March, the Civil Rights Move-
ment was transformed "from a protest movement into a rebel-
lion."37 Starting in Watts, Los Angeles, in 1965, a series of
violent race riots swept through American cities. 38 By the
summer of 1966, King's integrationist proclamations of "We
Shall Overcome" were increasingly drowned out by SNCC's
Stokely Carmichael and others demanding "Black Power,"
which connoted, for some, the exclusion of whites from the Civil
Rights Movement. 39 More and more African-Americans, in-
stead of seeking merely equality of opportunity, now demanded
an equality in substantive results that would have entailed real
and extensive social and economic changes-changes that
many white Americans were unwilling or unable (or both) to
deliver.40
In short, the transformation of the Civil Rights Movement
combined with other factors, most prominently the Vietnam
War, to sharply polarize Americans. Then, instead of Ameri-
cans coming together and healing wounds, the polarization of
the 1960s became fragmentation in the 1970s. A type of rights-
consciousness had emerged, echoing the Civil Rights Move-
ment, but now with more numerous and varied interest groups
seeking to have rights vindicated and past wrongs remedied.
When the National Organization for Women formed in 1966,
the Women's Movement stepped to the forefront of the national
scene.41 Environmental organizations and other public interest
groups also materialized.42 Even the major league baseball
players organized their own association.43 In sum, American
society appeared to have splintered irreparably into diverse
and opposed groups (or perhaps, more precisely, many Ameri-
cans first became aware of certain societal divisions that had
long existed). These disjunctures then "dominated American
life for decades after the 1960s."4 Even within a rights-
conscious society, the existence of so many groups simultane-
ously demanding justice for their causes meant that chances for
37. HODGSON, supra note 17, at 200.
38. See id. at 266.
39. See id. at 224.
40. See id. at 179. On the emergence of the Black Power movement, see
GARROW, supra note 17, at 481-525, and WEISBROT, supra note 27, at 196-221.
41. See PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 452.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 453.
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success in the form of real social change were minimal. Ameri-
can social structures resisted demands for rapid (and some-
times even incremental) changes, however legitimate such de-
mands might have been; and quite often, the demands for rapid
changes seemed eminently reasonable. Hope for social trans-
formation thus typically was brief and rapidly gave way to frus-
tration, pessimism, and cynicism.45
B. FRAGMENTATION OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY
The fragmentation of America eventually manifested itself
as strongly in the legal academy as across the rest of the na-
tion. In the words of Richard Posner, "[t]he spectrum of politi-
cal opinion in law schools, which in 1960 occupied a narrow
band between mild liberalism and mild conservatism, today
runs from Marxism, feminism, and left-wing nihilism and an-
archism on the left to economic and political libertarianism and
Christian fundamentalism on the right."46 Even those legal
scholars deemed somewhat centrist in their political beliefs of-
ten appear to be ideologically isolated from their colleagues. 47
To a great extent, the breakdown of consensus among law
professors resulted from the transformation of the demographic
45. See HODGSON, supra note 17, at 365, 492; MINDA, supra note 17, at
66; NOVICK, supra note 17, at 415; PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 452-53; see
also Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1991) (discussing rights-
consciousness).
46. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 766 (1987).
47. See id. at 769; see also KALMAN, supra note 17, at 239-40 (emphasiz-
ing a "collapse of consensus"). Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 110-56 (1991) (noting that
Brown impeded the Civil Rights Movement by inflaming Southern racists,
who were able to delay political changes) and Michael J. Kiarman, Brown, Ra-
cial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 150 (1994)
(noting that Brown indirectly aided the Civil Rights Movement by generating
violent Southern resistance which in turn aroused apathetic Northern whites
to support political change), with RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 758-61
(1975) (arguing that although Brown alone did not change America, it was the
central element in social change). Mark Tushnet argues that the Warren
Court itself contributed to the dissolution of the Great Society agenda and
thus undermined the Court's own legacy. See Mark Tushnet, The Warren
Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 19-21 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993). For example,
the Court's reapportionment decisions shifted political power from conserva-
tive rural areas to cities, where the larger populations initially resided. See id.
Population growth then shifted to the more conservative and Republican sub-
urbs, however. See id.
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makeup of the legal academy. Because of the successes of the
Civil Rights and Women's Movements, starting in the 1960s
and 1970s (however limited those successes might in fact have
been), an increasing number of women and persons of color en-
tered not only the legal profession but also the legal professori-
ate during the latter twentieth century.48 This diversification
of the legal academy was spurred by the boomtown atmosphere
prevalent in many law schools during the 1960s and 1970s.
For example, during the 1973-1974 academic year, following in
the wake of Watergate, "[o]ver 135,000 Law School Admission
Tests were administered... nearly 14,000 more than the pre-
vious year and almost twice as many as those given in any year
of the 1960s. The more than 125,000 enrolled law students in
1976 paid more than $275 million in tuition."49 With so many
students and so much tuition flowing in, many law faculties
expanded at a frenzied pace. Between 1967 and 1975, for ex-
ample, "the number of tenure track law teachers at the nation's
accredited law schools increased by 80 percent."50 During this
halcyon era, law schools could hire members of previously ex-
cluded outgroups-primarily women and racial minorities-
without threatening the security of white males. Indeed, as
their faculties frantically expanded, the law schools could
continue to hire substantial numbers of white males even as
outgroup members were simultaneously joining the faculties.
To illustrate, in 1960 only eleven out of 1,645 tenure track law
faculty were women, but by 1979 the number had increased to
516, 10.5 percent of a total that had risen to almost 5,000
faculty.51
The infusion of appreciable numbers of women and people
of color to law faculties led to the emergence of a type of "out-
sider jurisprudence."52 The writings of outgroup or minority
48. See Donna Fossum, Women Law Professors, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 903, 905-06; Grey, supra note 17, at 505.
49. KALMAN, supra note 17, at 61.
50. Fossum, supra note 48, at 914.
51. See id. at 906 (giving statistics on the number of women law faculty
members); see also Bender, supra note 17, at 4-5, 28-29 (discussing the
changing demographics since World War II in university professoriates gener-
ally).
52. Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 813, 818 (1992) (citing Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Ju-
risprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the
Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (1991) and Mari Matsuda, Look-
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 323 (1987)).
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scholars often revealed a vision of the legal system that sub-
stantially differed from that of the more mainstream and mod-
ernist scholars. When mainstream scholars saw the neutral
and objective application of legal rules-treating like cases
alike-some women and minority writers saw something en-
tirely different. The legal system, from the perspective of these
outgroup scholars, did not deal equally with different societal
groups. Rather, the manipulation of the rule of law itself was a
means for propagating social, economic, and political inequities.
In other words, mainstream and outgroup scholars both seemed
to observe the same social and legal events, but each group re-
spectively saw and experienced the events in strikingly differ-
ent ways. Mainstream modernist scholars, when confronted
with a significant legal event such as the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,53 typically believed that the event embod-
ied an essential truth about the law-a truth with a stable and
fixed core. Outgroup scholars, when confronted with the same
event, were more likely to recognize the existence of multiple
truths. For instance, an African-American constitutional
scholar might recognize more readily than a white scholar that
the Constitution is a tool of both oppression and liberation: the
Constitution appeared to legitimate slavery and Jim Crow laws
as legal institutions, yet supported the Civil Rights Movement
and desegregation. Thus, a person who lives (or perhaps empa-
thizes with) the truths of a minority or an outgroup stands
poised to recognize that the modernist's claimed essential or
core truth is merely the accepted truth of a dominant cultural
majority. 54
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 251-54 (1987) (suggesting that the Constitution
and American society can be transformed to eliminate economic oppression);
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REV. 985, 1015-21 (1990) (pro-
posing that religion both legitimated and delegitimated authority for African-
American slaves). But cf. BELL, supra, at 22 (arguing that guarantees of ra-
cial equality are transformed into devices to perpetuate the racial status quo).
For a discussion of the relationship between the law and social inequities, see
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 263-306 (1976) and Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Cen-
tury's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 35 (1993). For examples of various kinds of
outsider jurisprudence, see RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAw: SURVIVAL
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992), PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS (1991), Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991), Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993), Ruth Colker, An Embod-
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For this reason, the emergence of outsider jurisprudence
contributed to the development of postmodern legal thought. 55
Outgroup jurisprudents have urged other scholars to hear a
"different voice," and to acknowledge the legitimacy of an un-
usual or alternative view of the legal system.5 6 Indeed, when
one recognizes the emergence of multiple different voices-in-
cluding at least feminist, critical race, and more recently, gay
and lesbian theorists-then modernist claims to identify essen-
tial truths and ground knowledge on firm foundations become
highly problematic. The multiple voices of outsider jurispru-
dents uncover multiple truths where before but one truth was
evident. Outgroup scholars consequently have helped generate
and justify the anti-foundationalism and concomitant anti-
essentialism characteristic of postmodernism. Even the mod-
ernist meanings that appear most stable and fixed are disclosed
to be unstable and shifting. In the words of the critical race
and feminist scholar, Patricia J. Williams, "it really is possible
to see things-even the most concrete things-simultaneously
yet differently."57 In sum, the loss of consensus that broke
Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereo-
types, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
511 (1992).
55. I will offer a more comprehensive exploration of the factors contribut-
ing to the emergence of postmodern legal scholarship in a forthcoming book on
the history of American legal thought. See FELDMAN, supra note 9; see also
Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 346-52 (focusing on the role of the
Warren Court in pushing legal scholarship toward postmodernism).
56. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-4 (1982) (using the -term "different
voice" to describe a feminine ethic).
57. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from De-
constructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410-11 (1987); see Alvin
Kernan, Change in the Humanities and Higher Education, in WHAT'S
HAPPENED TO THE HuMANITIES? 3, 5-6 (Alvin Kernan ed., 1997) (arguing that
a "paradigm shift in higher education" has occurred due to changes in univer-
sity demographics). The use of narrative and storytelling is an important de-
velopment of outsider jurisprudence that manifests and reinforces postmodern
themes. See BELL, supra note 54 (emphasizing the role of storytelling); Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Di-
lemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (portraying fictitious
conversations between a law professor and student as prototypical examples of
storytelling); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (examining the use of story-
telling in the struggle for racial reform); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal
Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (1994) (characterizing traditional
modernist legal scholarship as a type of storytelling). Robert Cover was one of
the first legal scholars to suggest that "law and narrative are inseparably re-
lated." Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
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across America during the 1960s and 1970s eventually cut
through the legal professoriate, leaving an acutely fragmented
academy and contributing heavily to the emergence of various
postmodern themes in legal scholarship.5 8
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT: LIVING IN A
POSTMODERN WORLD
Unsurprisingly, this loss of consensus, experienced by
Americans in so many different ways, has also affected the Su-
preme Court. In fact, as with legal scholarship, fragmentation
has begun to usher certain postmodern themes into Rehnquist
Court opinions.
A. FRAGMENTATION CHALLENGES NEUTRALITY
During most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries-
that is, during the modern and premodern periods of American
legal thought-lawyers, judges, and law professors generally
agreed that judicial decision-making could be firmly grounded
on some solid foundation. Particularly in constitutional law,
preexisting natural or neutral baselines served as the supposed
foundations for judicial decisions. At certain points in Ameri-
can history, for instance, the common law rights of property
and contract were widely understood to be aspects of natural
law.59 The validity of constitutional claims could then be
measured from those common law baselines. For example,
Congress could regulate commerce, but could not go so far as to
violate preexisting natural rights to property or contract.60
As the twentieth century wore on, the consensus concern-
ing natural and neutral baselines for constitutional decision-
making gradually dissolved. Over the last twenty-five years,
the fragmentation of American society has transformed this
5 (1983).
58. For a more extended discussion of postmodern themes in legal schol-
arship, see Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 8, at 1084-1104.
59. See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 32-34 (1996) (evaluating
criticisms of the rights of contract and property as understood in American
law).
60. See id. at 23 (emphasizing the importance of a "plausible nonconstitu-
tional baseline of natural rights" during the pre-New Deal era); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 2-4 (1993) (arguing that the current
status quo often is taken as a baseline); Feldman, The Onset, supra note 4, at
1394-1417 (discussing premodern legal science of the nineteenth century as
characterized by a belief in natural law principles).
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disagreement into disbelief. Until around the 1970s, many
lawyers, judges, and law professors disagreed about the base-
lines for constitutional law-sometimes disagreeing vehe-
mently-but they nonetheless retained a belief that some-
where, somehow, there was a baseline and, therefore, that
objective constitutional decision-making was possible. During
those years, lawyers might disagree, but they still had their
modernist hope. Starting sometime during the 1970s, hope
faded away.61
As previously excluded or subjugated outgroups and mi-
norities began to voice their rights and claims, the idea that a
natural or neutral baseline or foundation truly existed began to
look like a myth. In fact, it began to look like a dangerously
misleading myth because it propagated cultural domination.
From the perspective of many outgroup and minority scholars,
the natural and neutral baselines of yesteryear were never
truly natural or neutral at all. Rather, those baselines repre-
sented no more than the cultural preferences of a dominant
majority in American society. From this vantage, competing
normative claims in constitutional law began to represent no
more than different cultural perspectives comprised of different
voices and different truths.6 2
Furthermore, these views did not remain solely the prov-
ince of outgroup scholars and the growing cadre of postmodern
theorists. Many mainstream scholars, lawyers, and judges
eventually began to doubt the existence of objective foundations
for constitutional decision-making when they confronted the
cacophony of zealously voiced positions regarding abortion, the
right of privacy, racial discrimination, reverse discrimination,
the right to die, and so on. Perhaps if some constitutional
scholar had successfully articulated a theory that objectively
grounded constitutional decision-making, then this trend would
have been halted. But from the 1960s onward, every proposed
61. See MINDA, supra note 17, at 189-246 (summarizing postmodern ju-
risprudence); Feldman, From Modernism, supra note 4, at 346-52 (discussing
the movement in legal thought from modernism to postmodernism).
62. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in
American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social
Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) (focusing on free speech and the major-
ity's depiction of minority groups in America); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (focusing on the requirement of intent for striking
down facially neutral laws under the Equal Protection Clause).
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theory was met with rebuke.63 Consensus was a thing of the
past. Ultimately, the postmodern idea that there were multiple
voices and multiple truths rippled outward through the legal
culture. To be sure, most mainstream scholars, lawyers, and
judges did not start to declare themselves to be out-and-out
postmodernists; in fact, few did so. But nonetheless, some
postmodern themes, particularly anti-foundationalism, began
to creep into the arguments and opinions of even avowed mod-
ernists, including some Supreme Court Justices. Thus, in the
words of Mark Tushnet, "constitutional law has been overtly
politicized."64
B. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Justices of the Supreme Court were unable to stop this
movement toward the postmodern. "The contemporary Su-
preme Court opinion," Paul F. Campos argues, "routinely dis-
plays all the persuasive power and aesthetic charm of a con-
gressional subcommittee report."65 This weakness of Supreme
Court opinions, moreover, is not due to the inabilities of the
Justices, but rather follows from the current Court's position in
a postmodern world. No Court, Campos continues, could stem
"the incoming tide of skepticism which the fundamental conflict
and stress of a heterogeneous, ideologically fractured nation
generates, and which inevitably erodes the former certainties of
a formalistic legal culture."66 In a postmodern world of multi-
ple voices and multiple truths, the Supreme Court Justices
have no resources for uniting the American people, no founda-
tions to build on, and no judicial tools to produce objective con-
63. In Democracy and Distrust, published in 1980, John Hart Ely persua-
sively criticized almost every constitutional theory that had been proposed to
that time. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). In turn, Ely's
own theory, representation reinforcement, was expeditiously repudiated by
others. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131
(1981) (supporting fundamental values review and criticizing representation
reinforcement review); Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981) (evaluating the "conven-
tional" and "new" constitutional theories).
64. Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1328.
65. Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REV. 817, 855
(1993).
66. Id. at 856; see SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 23 ("[Tlhe im-
pediments to good constitutional argument are structural rather than per-
sonal ."); cf. id. at 90 (arguing that current constitutional argument "is al-
most always divisive").
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clusions. Significantly, many of the Justices appear to recog-
nize as much.
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, came
close to announcing exactly that point.67 Casey reexamined the
issue of whether the Constitution protects a woman's interest
in choosing whether or not to have an abortion. Almost two
decades earlier, of course, Roe v. Wade held that the constitu-
tional right of privacy encompasses this interest.68 Justice
Blackmun began the majority opinion in Roe by suggesting
that, despite "the sensitive and emotional nature of the abor-
tion controversy,"69 the Court's decision would be legitimate be-
cause it would be objective. As Justice Blackmun phrased it,
the Court would "earnestly" resolve the case "by constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and of predilection."70 By the
time that the Rehnquist Court decided Casey, after twenty
years of post-Roe anti-abortion and pro-choice litigation, rheto-
ric, protests, and violence, the Justices did not even hint that
the decision was objective. To the contrary, the Court claimed
to decide in accordance with "reasoned judgment," which, the
joint opinion explained, does not have boundaries "susceptible
of expression as a simple rule."71 Justice Souter recently reit-
erated the value of "reasoned judgment," especially for substan-
tive due process cases, where the Court must simultaneously
attend to detail, understand history, retain flexibility, and
maintain a critical eye.72
In an important part of the Casey joint opinion, the Court
extensively discussed the doctrine of stare decisis and the pos-
sibility of overruling Roe.7 3 Ultimately, the Casey Court reaf-
firmed Roe and its main holding that there is a constitutional
67. 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992).
68. See id. at 844-53.
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
70. Id.
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
72. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 789 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Souter attributes the idea of reasoned judgment
to Justice Harlan. See id. at 769 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-44
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). An examination of Harlan's dissent in Poe re-
veals, however, that while Harlan discusses reason and judgment, he does not
use the term "reasoned judgment." See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-44 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
73. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69.
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right to choose whether to have an abortion before viability.7 4
Most interestingly, in the course of this discussion, the joint
opinion self-reflexively pondered how overruling Roe might un-
dermine the Court's own legitimacy. Unlike in Roe, the Casey
Court did not proclaim that its legitimacy was grounded on
being objective. Instead, the Casey Court suggested that its le-
gitimacy arose from public perceptions of the Court and its de-
cisions. 75 For the Court to retain its power, the joint opinion
reasoned, the American people must believe that the Court's
decisions are based on constitutional principles. 76 If the Court
were to overrule Roe, however, the Casey decision would seem
too political, injudicious, and unprincipled. The Court specu-
lated that it could not even "pretend" to overrule Roe on a prin-
cipled basis.77 Therefore, the joint opinion concluded, a decision
to overrule would seriously undermine the Court's power and
legitimacy.
Now, why do I propose that the Rehnquist Court in Casey
manifested postmodernism, at least to some degree? For one
thing, the Court's extended self-reflexive turn upon its own
practices resonates with postmodernism. Postmodernists often
turn toward their own social practices and make the cultural
and theoretical awareness of those practices part of the prac-
tices themselves. In a sense, postmodernism transforms prac-
tices to include self-reflexive awareness.78 Beyond this point,
and in clear opposition to the more modernist pretensions of
Roe, the Casey Court did not claim that its decision was objec-
tive or based on some firm foundation. Yet, according to the
Court, the lack of a foundation is not overly important because
what really matters is not objectivity but rather, public percep-
74. See id. at 869-70.
75. See id. at 854-61.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
78. Steven Connor observes:
In trying to understand our contemporary selves in the moment of the
present, there are no safely-detached observation-posts, not in "sci-
ence," "religion," or even in "history." We are in and of the moment
that we are attempting to analyse, in and of the structures we employ
to analyse it. One might almost say that this terminal self-
consciousness.., is what characterizes our contemporary or "post-
modern" moment.
CONNOR, supra note 7, at 5; cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution
of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 30, 36-37 (1993) (emphasizing the joint opinion's "highly self-conscious
discussion of the question ofjudicial legitimacy").
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tions.79 The Court's legitimacy depends on nothing deeper than
perceptions and beliefs. In Casey, the Court seemed to ac-
knowledge that it operates in a hall of mirrors. The Justices
must therefore be concerned not to change directions too
abruptly for fear that they might strike and shatter a mirror.
If that were to happen, then all perceptions of legitimacy would
go awry.
Paradoxically, though, the mere fact that the Casey Court
turned to gaze upon itself and to contemplate its own practices
self-reflexively suggests that traditional or modernist notions of
legitimacy are no longer relevant. For, of course, if the Court's
power were truly threatened, the Court would not save itself by
expressly announcing that it was deciding a case for the benefit
of public perceptions. The Court, if it were truly threatened,
would not suggest that it might decide the instant case differ-
ently if only it could pretend to decide on a principled basis. To
the contrary, a purely modernist Court, like the Court in Roe v.
Wade, would briefly and forcefully assert that its conclusions
were objectively grounded on a firm foundation. By openly ex-
amining its own legitimacy, the Casey Court instead suggests
the possibility that, at least in most cases, it could actually say
anything in an opinion because the Court's power and legiti-
macy no longer arise from or depend on its opinions. So few
people still take the Court's opinions seriously that the Justices
could, for instance, quote poetry in their opinions-and few
people would notice, and even fewer would care.
In fact, that is exactly what Chief Justice Rehnquist has
done-quoted poetry-at length. In the first flag desecration
case, Texas v. Johnson, decided in 1989, the Court held that the
burning of an American flag in political protest was symbolic
conduct protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.80 The Court's decision effectively invalidated
statutes of forty-eight states and the federal government that
had prohibited desecration of the flag.81  Chief Justice
79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69. The Casey Court suggested that over-
ruling Roe v. Wade would severely undermine its "legitimacy" in the eyes of
the public. See id. at 865.
80. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
81. See Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 679, 725 (discussing the effects of Texas v. Johnson). The deci-
sion in Johnson led to national calls for the prohibition of flag desecration pur-
suant to either a constitutional amendment or a federal statute that would
pass constitutional muster. See id. at 725-27. In October 1989, Congress en-
acted a statute, The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103
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Rehnquist dissented, commencing his opinion by suggesting
that American history constitutionally justified flag desecration
statutes. 82 He thus proceeded into a rendition of that history
based primarily on poetry. He began with Ralph Waldo Emer-
son's Concord Hymn:
By the rude bridge that arched the flood
Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,
Here once the embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot heard round the world.83
The Chief Justice then turned to the story of Francis Scott Key
and the Star-Spangled Banner, from which Rehnquist quoted
several lines.84 Finally, he turned to John Greenleaf Whittier's
Civil War poem, Barbara Frietchie, which recounts a tale of a
ninety-year-old woman flying the Union flag as Confederate
troops, led by Stonewall Jackson, marched through her Mary-
land town.85 When Jackson first saw the flag, he had his men
shoot it down. Barbara Frietchie, though, snatched up the flag
and waved it back at the Confederate troops, challenging them
to shoot again. Whittier wrote:
"Shoot, if you must, this old gray head,
But spare your country's flag," she said.
A shade of sadness, a blush of shame,
Over the face of the leader came;
The nobler nature within him stirred
To life at that woman's deed and word:
"Who touches a hair of yon gray head
Dies like a dog! March on!" he said.86
In fact, Rehnquist did not merely quote a passage of the poem,
he inserted the entire composition, all sixty lines.87
Rehnquist's somewhat bohemian conception of authorita-
tive sources in Johnson contrasts strikingly with another of his
Stat. 777 (1989), which the Court eventually held to be unconstitutional. See
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
82. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the unique position of the flag as a symbol of our nation may jus-
tify its protection).
83. Id. at 422.
84. See id. at 423.
85. See id. at 424-25.
86. Id. Rehnquist has used unusual or bizarre references and quotations
in other cases. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1987)
(referring to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's "dog that didn't bark").
87. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 424-25.
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dissents, written fifteen years earlier in a case that also in-
volved flag desecration. In Smith v. Goguen, decided in 1974,
the Court held that a Massachusetts state flag desecration
statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.88 Unsur-
prisingly, Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, dissented. As
in the later case of Johnson, Rehnquist referred to poems (and
also songs) in his dissenting opinion.89 He even quoted the
identical passage from Emerson.90 Beyond Emerson, though,
Rehnquist quoted from none of the other poems or songs except
for two words from Barbara Frietchie.91 His legal reasoning
was far more conventional or modernist; his discussion of verse
was brief and intended merely to underscore the importance of
the flag in American life.92
So despite the similarities between the cases of Johnson
and Smith v. Goguen, Rehnquist changed during the interval of
fifteen years and became, we might say, more avant garde. He
is not alone in this group. In fact, his leading partner is proba-
bly Justice Scalia. An excellent example of the postmodern
Scalia is in the recent case of County of Sacramento v. Lewis.93
Lewis involved a police officer who allegedly had been deliber-
ately or recklessly indifferent to life during the apprehension of
a suspected offender.9 4 The Court held that the officer, under
the circumstances, had not violated the Fourteenth Amend-
88. 415 U.s. 566, 582 (1974). Goguen had been convicted for violating the
Massachusetts law when he "wore a small cloth version of the United States
flag sewn to the seat of his trousers." Id. at 568.
89. See id. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist refers to the po-
etry of John Greenleaf Whittier and Ralph Waldo Emerson, and musical
works by John Phillip Sousa, George M. Cohan, and Francis Scott Key. See
id.; infra note 92.
90. See 415 U.S. at 601.
91. See id. at 602.
92. In Smith v. Goguen, after the quotation from Emerson, Rehnquist
wrote:
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Senior, celebrated the flag that had flown
on "Old Ironsides" during the War of 1812, and John Greenleaf
Whittier made Barbara Frietchie's devotion to the "silken scarf' in
the teeth of Stonewall Jackson's ominous threats the central theme of
his familiar poem. John Philip Sousa's "Stars and Stripes Forever"
and George M. Cohan's "It's a Grand Old Flag" are musical celebra-
tions of the flag familiar to adults and children alike. Francis Scott
Key's "Star Spangled Banner" is the country's national anthem.
Id. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
94. See id. at 836-39.
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ment's guarantee of substantive due process.95 Scalia agreed
with the Court's conclusion but refused to join Justice Souter's
majority opinion. 96  In his concurrence, Scalia criticized
Souter's standard for determining a violation of substantive
due process.97 The Souter majority opinion pronounced that an
executive action violates substantive due process only if it is so
"arbitrary" that it "shocks the conscience."98 Scalia maintained
that this standard not only was overly subjective but also had
been rejected by the Court only a year earlier, in the case of
Washington v. Glucksberg.99 According to Scalia, Souter's con-
currence in Glucksberg had proposed a similar standard of ar-
bitrariness, and the Glucksberg majority had repudiated it.1°°
To make his point, Scalia relied on the famed songwriter (and
now, perhaps, legal authority), Cole Porter. Specifically, Scalia
paraphrased a passage from Porter's song, You're the Top, to
suggest that Souter's substantive due process standard was the
ultimate in subjectivity:
[Ihf anything, today's opinion is even more of a throw-back to highly
subjective substantive-due-process methodologies than [Souter's] con-
currence in Glucksberg was. Whereas the latter said merely that
substantive due process prevents "arbitrary impositions" and "pur-
poseless restraints" (without any objective criterion as to what is arbi-
trary or purposeless), today's opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra,
the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Ghandi, the Celophane of subjec-
tivity, th' ol' "shocks-the-conscience" test. 0'
95. See id. at 854-55.
96. See id. at 860-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 860-62.
98. Id. at 846-49, 852-55.
99. See id. at 860-62; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-22
(1997).
100. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 861 (paraphrasing Cole Porter, You're the Top (1934), reprinted
in THE COMPLETE LYRICS OF COLE PORTER 169 (Robert Kimball ed., 1983)).
In a footnote, Scalia added: "For those unfamiliar with classical music, I note
that the exemplars of excellence in the text are borrowed from Cole Porter's
'You're the Top,' copyright 1934." Id. at 861 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
Clinton v. City of New York, which held the Line Item Veto Act unconstitu-
tional, Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion referred to President Nixon
as "the Mahatma Ghandi of all impounders." 524 U.S. 417, 468 (1998) (Scalia,
J., concurring and dissenting). In light of Scalia's use of the same phrase, "the
Mahatma Ghandi," in his Lewis concurrence-where he expressly para-
phrased Cole Porter and connoted that something was the ultimate or the
highest-Scalia apparently meant something similar in the line item veto
case. That is, Scalia meant to suggest that Nixon was the ultimate or greatest
impounder. For another unusual passage from Scalia, see United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 601-03 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing a
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How, then, do Rehnquist's and Scalia's invocations of poets
and songwriters relate to postmodernism? Rehnquist and
Scalia appear to suggest that they are not writing their opin-
ions with the earnestness that had characterized more mod-
ernist Justices and times. By including in their opinions
somewhat bizarre passages and references-bizarre, that is,
from a modernist perspective-Rehnquist and Scalia implicitly
allude to a form of postmodern irony. Their method for com-
municating that irony closely resembles a technique that, in
overtly postmodern circles, is sometimes called pastiche: the
juxtaposition in one text of different styles, sources, and tradi-
tions. Pastiche is intended in part to connote the contingency
of each of the various styles, sources, and traditions. Pastiche,
then, is a postmodernist's means for communicating the idea of
anti-foundationalism even while using sources and tools associ-
ated with modernist methods and goals. Put in a different way,
an author's use of unconventional and unexpected sources and
styles can represent a wink or a nod to the reader. This wink
or nod signifies postmodern irony: the reader is warned that
even though the author might use ostensible modernist tools
and sources, the author uses them with the self-reflexive
awareness that they cannot deliver modernist objectivity.10 2
Pastiche also shows the postmodernist breaking through
the boundaries or disciplinary fences of a particular practice,
thus suggesting the contingency and plasticity of that practice
and its ostensible truths. Modernists tend to think of practices,
such as judicial decision-making, as reducible to a limited and
identifiable quantity of methods, activities, norms, and rhetori-
cal conventions. Philip Bobbitt, for instance, has argued that
constitutional decision-making consists of precisely six different
modes (or modalities) of argumentation, such as a focus on the
constitutional text or on the history of the framing. 0 3 The quo-
tation or citation of poems and songs, to be certain, was not one
of Bobbitt's six modes.
When postmodernists breach the boundaries of a practice-
by relying on unusual sources or by using an interdisciplinary
lengthy quotation from the Virginia Military Institute's The Code of a Gentle-
man).
102. On pastiche, see JAMESON, supra note 7, at 16, and Sanford Levinson
& J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1597, 1639-40 (1991).
103. See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1303
(1989); see also generally PHILIP BOBBITr, CONsTITuTIONAL FATE (1982);
PHIiP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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approach-they call into question modernist notions of practice
and truth, which suddenly seem no longer as rigid and stable
as the modernist had hoped and proposed. Indeed, for similar
reasons, postmodern deconstructionists who follow the French
philosopher Jacques Derrida often insist "on using words in
unorthodox ways, on writing in ways that attempt to break the
circle of conventional" practices and logic.'04 It is this purpose-
ful unorthodoxy that often leads modernist critics to accuse
Derridean deconstructionists of being muddied and bewilder-
ing. Rehnquist's and Scalia's pastiche-like use of sources seems
to have had a similar effect on some readers. One commentator
discussing Rehnquist's Johnson dissent observed that "the his-
torical and literary materials Rehnquist selects have a random
quality that is dizzying.. ... -105
It is worth emphasizing, though, that the use of unortho-
dox or unconventional sources and arguments is not merely
dizzying or confusing, but rather suggests a postmodern van-
tage. When the postmodernist, besides using the unconven-
tional, also uses conventional or modernist sources and tools,
the reader can surmise that the latter are being used ironically.
By mixing the unconventional with the conventional, the post-
modernist implies that even the modernist sources and tools
cannot deliver objectively grounded results. Thus, when the
postmodern scholar or the postmodern Supreme Court Justice
continues to participate in their respective practices-whether
it be legal scholarship or judicial decision-making-we know
that they must, in effect, be playing with the pieces. Postmod-
ernists use modernist sources and tools even though they no
longer earnestly believe in their efficacy. Justices such as
Rehnquist and Scalia might continue to use the modernist tools
of constitutional adjudication, but they do so playfully and
ironically, knowing that the tools cannot deliver objective con-
clusions.
This postmodern idea of playing with the pieces is illus-
trated most clearly in a series of habeas corpus cases decided
104. Ronald KML. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEx. L. REV. 215, 227
(1997) (reviewing JACQUES DERRIDA & JOHN D. CAPUTO, DECONSTRUCTION IN
A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES DERRIDA (1997)).
105. See Ray, supra note 13, at 571. Marie Ashe writes: "Deconstruction of
literary texts has often appeared as an 'infinite regress' within textuality, a
dizzying multiplication of rereading upon rereading." Marie Ashe, Inventing
Choreographies: Feminism and Deconstruction, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1125
(1990) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 84:673
A FLYING ELEPHANT
by the Supreme Court. Teague v. Lane106 and its progeny ad-
dressed the question of whether constitutional rules of criminal
procedure should apply retroactively in habeas corpus cases.
Writing for a plurality, Justice O'Connor articulated two impor-
tant points in the Teague decision. First, she stated that the
question of retroactivity should be the threshold issue in any
case which might require the Court to announce or apply a new
rule of constitutional law.10 7 Second, O'Connor pronounced a
general rule to determine retroactivity: with two narrow excep-
tions, new constitutional rules would not be applied or an-
nounced in habeas proceedings. 08 Hence, after Teague, the
crux of any habeas case became the determination of whether it
involved the application or articulation of a new rule. If a case
involved a new rule, then the habeas court would need to de-
cline to reach the merits of the claim and to deny the petition
(unless one of the two exceptions applied). The problem was
that, as even the Teague plurality acknowledged, to categorize
a constitutional rule as either new or old might often present a
formidable challenge. 10 9
In Penry v. Lynaugh, decided later in the same term as
Teague, a majority of the Justices adopted the Teague approach
to retroactivity in habeas cases.110 Surprisingly, however, the
majority held that one of Penry's habeas claims did not seek
the application or announcement of a new rule."' Conse-
quently, the Teague rule against new rules in habeas cases did
not bar consideration of the merits of Penry's claim.112
Justice Scalia vehemently dissented in Penry, arguing that
the majority had construed the concept of a new rule far too
106. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
107. See id. at 300-05.
108. See id. at 310 ("Unless they fall within an exception to the general
rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to
those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.").
109. See id. at 301-02.
110. 492 U.S. 302, 314-15, 329-30 (1989).
111. See id. at 315, 330. The Court considered two claims. The first was
whether a failure to instruct the jury as to mitigating evidence violated the
Eighth Amendment. See id. at 307. The Court determined that this did not
raise the issue of a new rule, but rather an application of an existing rule. See
id. at 315. The second claim was whether "the Eighth Amendment categori-
cally prohibits" execution of a person who is "mentally retarded." Id. at 307.
The Court concluded that while it did implicate a new rule, Penry was still en-
titled to consideration because it fell within the first of the Teague exceptions.
See id. at 330; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
112. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 300, 315.
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narrowly. 13 In making his argument, Scalia appeared to cross
the shadowy border separating modernism from postmodern-
ism. In particular, Scalia self-reflexively turned to consider le-
gal reasoning in constitutional cases: "In a system based on
precedent and stare decisis, it is the tradition to find each deci-
sion 'inherent' in earlier cases (however well concealed its pres-
ence might have been), and rarely to replace a previously an-
nounced rule with a new one." n 4 In this postmodern self-
reflexive moment, Scalia appeared to recognize that in judicial
practice, all rulings can theoretically be deemed either old or
new, that is, either as based on or as distinguishable from
precedent. Elsewhere, Scalia made this point more lucidly. He
suggested in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,'15 which
was unrelated to habeas corpus, that even if judges make law,
they must pretend to discover it:
"[Tihe judicial Power of the United States" conferred upon this
Court... must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by
our common-law tradition. That is the power "to say what the law
is," not the power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our
forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make"
law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though
they were "finding" it-discerning what the law is, rather than de-
creeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be." 6
In the context of habeas corpus, therefore, Scalia plainly was
concerned that every institutional decision could be at least
reasonably construed as arising from an old rule. Scalia there-
fore proposed in his Penry dissent an exceedingly broad concep-
tion of new rules in order to avoid "gutting" the Teague barrier
to habeas relief.117
Significantly, despite the Penry holding, a majority of Jus-
tices largely accepted Scalia's arguments in Butler v. McKel-
lar."8 In a state prosecution, Butler had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death." 9 The Butler Court, with a
majority opinion written by none other than Chief Justice
Rehnquist, broadly interpreted the ambiguous Teague guide-
113. See id. at 352-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 353.
115. 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). This case
involved the retroactive application of a rule of constitutional law in the con-
text of a state tax refid. See id. at 532-34.
116. Id. at 549 (citations omitted) (emphasis added and omitted).
117. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 353.
118. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
119. See id. at 408.
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lines for the identification of new rules with the result that the
writ of habeas corpus was practically eviscerated. Rehnquist
wrote: "The 'new rule' principle... validates reasonable, good-
faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state
courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later deci-
sions."120 In other words, so long as a state court's interpreta-
tion of precedent and denial of a defendant's constitutional
claim was reasonable and in good faith, the defendant's claim
in a habeas petition would be deemed a request for a new rule
of constitutional law. Under Butler, therefore, unless a state
court arbitrarily, recklessly, or deliberately ignored precedent,
federal habeas relief would be barred.
Most important for the purposes of this Essay, Rehnquist's
majority opinion suggested a dramatic and sustained embrace
of postmodernism. Rehnquist began by echoing Scalia's mo-
ment of postmodern insight: "In the vast majority of cases ...
[a] new decision is reached by an extension of the reasoning of
previous cases."121  Thus, as with Scalia, Rehnquist self-
reflexively turned to consider legal reasoning and discerned
that, in judicial practice, every constitutional decision can be
reasonably construed as arising from an old rule. Like Scalia,
too, Rehnquist recognized that this possibility threatened to
undermine the Teague barrier, and therefore he enunciated a
broad definition of new rules. Even so, Rehnquist most clearly
disclosed his postmodern inclinations when he applied his
broad definition of new rules to the facts in the Butler case it-
self.
Butler based his habeas petition on Arizona v. Roberson,122
which the Court decided after his conviction became final.1 23
Butler maintained that Roberson vindicated his precise consti-
tutional claim, which involved the Fifth Amendment. 124
Moreover, Butler persuasively argued that Roberson itself did
not announce a new rule of constitutional law. 25 In particular,
Butler contended that the Roberson Court merely had applied
the rule from an earlier case, Edwards v. Arizona,126 "to -a
120. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 412-13.
122. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
123. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 410-11.
124. See id. at 408, 411, 414.
125. See id. at 414-15.
126. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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slightly different set of facts."127 Butler supported his conten-
tion by underscoring that the Roberson Court "had said that
Roberson's case was directly controlled by Edwards,"1 28 that
Arizona, when arguing in Roberson, had requested the Court to
create an "exception" to Edwards,'29 and that the Roberson
Court believed that case was "within the 'logical compass' of
Edwards."130 In sum, Butler requested the Court to apply to
his factual situation an old rule of constitutional law-a rule
already articulated clearly in Edwards and then reaffirmed in
Roberson.
Rehnquist responded to this strong argument with a post-
modern twist:
[T]he fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical
compass" of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a
prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the
current decision is a "new rule" under Teague. Courts frequently view
their decisions as being "controlled" or "governed" by prior opinions
even when aware of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other
courts.'
31
Ann Althouse has observed that Rehnquist, at this point,
acted as a playwright who "wandered onto the stage and an-
nounced-essentially---'Of course, you must realize, this is only
a play.'" 132 To highlight the degree of Rehnquist's postmodern
turn, I extend and transform this analogy. Instead of imagin-
ing Rehnquist as a playwright, imagine him as being in the
movie, The Truman Show,133 which portrays a character,
Truman Burbank, who unknowingly lives his entire life as the
protagonist on a successful television show. In fact, let us call
our movie The Rehnquist Show. What would The Rehnquist
Show reveal about our principal character, William H.
Rehnquist?
When Rehnquist wrote in Butler that "a court says that its
decision is within the 'logical compass' of an earlier decision," 134
he referred not to just any court. Rather, Rehnquist spoke of
the Supreme Court and the relationship between its opinions in
127. Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See id.
130. Id. at 415.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Ann Althouse, Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 929, 965.
133. THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount 1998).
134. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
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Roberson and Edwards. Rehnquist thus expressly turned his
postmodern and self-reflexive focus on the Supreme Court's
own specific use of legal reasoning. In an important sense,
Rehnquist did not act as a playwright who wanders on stage to
speak to the audience. A playwright does not commonly par-
ticipate in the performance of a play and does not ordinarily
speak directly to the audience. The playwright speaks indi-
rectly by writing words for the characters in the play. But the
Supreme Court Justices instead constantly and actively par-
ticipate in the practices of law and judicial decision-making.
And within those practices, the Justices always speak directly
to their audience of readers. Hence, Rehnquist was not the dis-
tanced creator or outsider-the playwright-who wandered
onto stage to comment on the illusions of the production. He
was the actor, Bill Rehnquist, who suddenly stepped out of his
character, as the Chief Justice on The Rehnquist Show, to say,
"Hey, this is only a TV show!"
But even this metaphorical comparison does not ade-
quately capture how much Rehnquist resembles Truman
Burbank. For just like a playwright, an actor always knows it
is only a TV show. Rehnquist and the other Justices, on the
other hand, usually do not know it is only a show. Instead,
they actively participate in the practices of law and judicial de-
cision-making: they do not understand those practices as illu-
sionary or somehow unreal. Rehnquist, for most of his life,
then, was just like Truman Burbank. Rehnquist was a person
who believed that he lived in the real world but suddenly real-
ized that he was only a character in a TV show. Then he
turned to the ever-present camera and proclaimed, "Hey, this is
only a show! It's only a TV show."
Rehnquist's postmodernism does not stop there. The
Rehnquist Show goes far beyond The Truman Show. After re-
alizing that he is only a character in a television show,
Rehnquist then recognized that, for him, there was no world
other than his show. He is Bill Rehnquist, Chief Justice. Un-
like Truman Burbank, Rehnquist cannot walk off the produc-
tion set and exit the studio complex. No other or greater reality
exists for Bill Rehnquist. 135 Life is no deeper-it has no firmer
135. Rehnquist, in a sense, therefore rejects what Pierre Schlag calls the
"theater of the rational," which "is precisely the kind of theater that is
grounded in the forgetting of its own theatricality. To play a part in this thea-
ter is to rule out the recognition that one is doing theater." Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 884 (1991).
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foundation-than the flickering images of a show on a televi-
sion screen. So what is a Supreme Court Chief Justice to do?
Plunge paralyzed into a nightmare of nihilistic despair? Of
course not! Our stalwart star, Bill Rehnquist, continues to per-
form as a Supreme Court Chief Justice always performs, only
now with the arched eyebrow of postmodern irony. Hence,
Rehnquist turned toward the ever-present camera and wrote:
In Roberson, for instance, the Court found Edwards controlling but
acknowledged a significant difference of opinion on the part of several
lower courts that had considered the question previously... It would
not have been an illogical or even a grudging application of Edwards
to decide that it did not extend to the facts ofRoberson.36
These lines can be fairly rephrased as follows: "Well, of course,
the Roberson Court said it was applying an old rule, but we can
always say that. And remember, we also can always say we are
applying a new rule. We are, after all, no more nor less than
characters on a TV show. We can ad-lib, change the script, or
whatever, so long as we maintain our production revenues." 137
Rehnquist then concluded with a wink and a nod: "We hold,
therefore, that Roberson announced a 'new rule." 138
Now, take a moment to recall exactly what was at stake in
Butler. The case was not merely about the intricacies of habeas
corpus doctrine. Butler had been convicted of a capital of-
fense. 139 The Supreme Court's denial of his habeas petition
consequently meant almost certain death for Butler. Suddenly,
Rehmquist's lines remind us of a different movie character, the
Terminator, as Rehnquist almost taunts Butler with a signa-
ture sign-off: "Hasta la vista, baby."140
Rehnquist, instead, is in the theater of the postmodern.
136. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
137. Justice Brennan wrote in dissent in Butler:
The only conclusion discernible from the majority's discussion is
that the majority would label "new" any rule of law favoring a state
prisoner that can be distinguished from prior precedent on any con-
ceivable basis, legal or factual. The converse of this conclusion is
that, in the majority's view, adjudication according to "prevailing" law
must consist solely of applying binding precedents to factual disputes
that cannot be distinguished from prior cases in any imaginable way.
Id. at 421-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 415.
139. See id. at 407.
140. THE TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984). See generally STEVEN
JOHNSON, INTERFACE CULTuRE 74 (1997) (noting how teenagers playing on-
line death and doom games, like Quake and Doom, accompany their bursts of
death-dealing fire with "Schwarzenegger-style taunts ('Hasta la vista,
baby!')"). Subsequently, Congress amended the habeas corpus statute to be
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In sum, Rehnquist and Scalia are playing with the pieces.
These two Justices most often still use the traditional modern-
ist tools of judicial decision-making, such as the doctrine of
stare decisis. They parse the supposedly precise meanings of
various case precedents and weave elaborate webs of rationally
consistent legal propositions. Rehnquist and Scalia know,
however, that these types of legal arguments are just the tat-
tered remnants of their modernist beliefs.14' They know that
their decisions are not objective and do not rest on firm founda-
tions. They know, in the words of Scalia, that "the Court is en-
titled to call a 'central holding' whatever it wants to call a 'cen-
tral holding.'"'42 They know better than anyone else that
Supreme Court Justices rarely write the opinions that bear
their names. Their clerks do most of the writing.143 Indeed, the
clerks largely determine which cases the Court will decide. 144
Yet the Justices also know that it all does not really matter.
The structures of the Court's power are too well-entrenched in
American society: the content of the Court's opinions thus nei-
ther legitimate nor undermine the Court's position and
more consistent with the Teague line of cases. See Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (see
especially the codification at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. III 1997)).
141. I paraphrase Louis Seidman and Mark Tushnet here. See SEIDMAN &
TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 23.
142. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 993-94 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Scalia's dissent in United States v. Virginia made
a similar point in several places. For example, he refers to the Court's equal
protection standards-rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scru-
tiny-as "made-up tests." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He added: "These tests are no more scientific than
their names suggest, and a further element of randomness is added by the fact
that it is largely up to us which test will be applied in each case." Id. at 567.
Plus, he argued, with regard to the intermediate scrutiny test, the Justices
"essentially apply it when it seems like a good idea to load the dice." Id. at
568.
143. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 146 (1994).
144. See id. at 146-48; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME
COURT DECIDES CASES 48-55, 256-62 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1327.
In the words of Jack Balkin, the Court applies in this postmodern era "quasi-
industrial methods to the administration ofjustice." Balkin, supra note 10, at
1983. Rehnquist has admitted that his clerks write the first draft of almost all
opinions issued in his name. See SCHWARTZ, supra, at 52. According to Mary
Ann Glendon, only Scalia and Stevens supposedly take a "leading role" in
writing opinions. See GLENDON, supra note 143, at 146. Bernard Schwartz
adds that, contrary to the usual belief that oral argument substantively mat-
ters, "the principal purpose of the argument before the Justices is a public-
relations one." SCHWARTZ, supra, at 16.
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power.145 The Court will continue to decide cases, and the Jus-
tices will continue to write-or at least, to sign-their opinions.
The Court will continue to deal life and death-for, to be sure,
the Justices play seriously. That is their role in a postmodern
world.
IV. CONCLUSION: DECIDING WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS
The Supreme Court Justices may live in a postmodern
world, but they are not necessarily therefore overt or avowed
postmodernists. If you were to ask Chief Justice Rehnquist
whether he is a postmodernist I am confident that he either
would say, "No," or laugh in your face. But that is not the
point. According to Fredric Jameson, "we are within the cul-
ture of postmodernism to the point where its facile repudiation
is as impossible as any equally facile celebration of it is compla-
cent and corrupt."146 The point, then, is that the Supreme
Court Justices live in a postmodern culture. As such, they are
influenced occasionally to act in a postmodern way and to have
a postmodern attitude-in short, to be postmodern Justices.
And the Justices do so regardless of whether or not they would
identify themselves as postmodernists. 147
145. See BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 97-101 (arguing that state domination
no longer needs intellectually generated legitimation); Timothy R. Johnson &
Andrew D. Martin, The Public's Conditional Response to Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 92 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 299, 299 (1998) (emphasizing the public's accep-
tance of the Supreme Court as a legitimate institution by drawing on research
showing that even individuals who know little about the Court hold it in high
regard). But cf. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1975) (1973) (arguing that economic and political struc-
tures are not receiving the needed support of cultural legitimation).
146. JAMESON, supra note 7, at 62 (emphasis added and omitted).
147. It is worth noting that Robert Post, reviewing Fredric Jameson's book
on postmodernism, argued that "[tihere is no postmodern law, although there
are postmodern commentaries on law." Robert Post, Postmodern Temptations,
4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391, 396 (1992) (reviewing JAMESON, supra note 7).
Thus, from Post's viewpoint, Supreme Court Justices cannot evince postmod-
ern themes: "We can thus expect a social practice to remain untouched by
postmodernism if its participants retain a healthy respect for the authority of
the relevant standards of the practice." Post, supra, at 396. My argument, in
part, is that at least some of the Justices no longer "retain a healthy respect"
for traditional modernist judicial tools or practices even though the Justices
continue to use them.
Jack Balkin and Jay Mootz seem to disagree about the nature of postmod-
ernism, or at least about the best way to understand postmodernism. Balkin
emphasizes the material and cultural elements of postmodernity, while Mootz
stresses postmodern theory and intellectual thought. Compare Balkin, supra
note 10, with Mootz, supra note 10. To me, a postmodern attitude toward this
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As is often the case with postmodernism, however, there is
a paradox here. To be sure, postmodernism has infused Su-
preme Court decision-making, but Supreme Court postmod-
ernism can materialize in strange ways. In particular, as al-
ready suggested, postmodern scholars or theorists tend to
stress the instability of textual meanings. 48 Many postmodern
theorists seem to enjoy few things more than deconstructing a
widely accepted and dominant reading of an important text,
whether it be from literature, philosophy, law, or elsewhere.
Such a deconstruction of a dominant reading inevitably dis-
closes previously suppressed alternative meanings or truths for
the text. These postmodern deconstructionists, then, are
clearly hostile to any authoritative pronouncement of a single
meaning for a text. Yet, such authoritative pronouncements
routinely issue from the Supreme Court. After all, the role of
the Supreme Court is, to a great extent, to proclaim the law so
as to decide cases. Whereas many postmodern theorists cele-
brate the multiplicity of textual meanings and truths-the idea
that "truth keeps happening"'49 -the Supreme Court's authori-
tative pronouncements effectively suppress or kill alternative
meanings. 150 Jacques Derrida might declare that a text's
meaning is undecidable, but the Supreme Court Justices must
decide.' 5 ' Law professors can revel in textual ambiguities-in
fact, such ambiguities helpfully generate a plethora of scholarly
publications-but Supreme Court Justices must pronounce the
law.152
Hence, because of the Court's position as an authoritative
pronouncer of law, the Justices, at least in their roles as Jus-
debate is that they are both right. That is, neither the material and cultural,
on one hand, nor the theoretical and intellectual, on the other hand, is pre-
eminent in a full understanding of postmodernism. In particular narratives of
postmodernism, one or the other might be highlighted, but the other always
remains equally important.
148. See, e.g., DERRIDA & CAPUTO, supra note 104, at 25-28.
149. JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAAIER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF
TRUTH AND METHOD 9 (1985).
150. See Cover, supra note 57, at 40, 53 (discussing how courts, in effect,
kill legal meaning).
151. Derrida explains that a text is iterable: a text, that is, can be repeated
(or read) in different contexts, so its meaning can change. DERRIDA &
CAPUTO, supra note 104, at 27-28; J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and
Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 749, 779 (1987).
152. See Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 8, at 1095-96 (explaining
how the characteristics of postmodernism help generate themes for postmod-
ern legal scholarship).
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tices, are unlikely to become thoroughgoing postmodern theo-
rists in the same way that law professors might. Instead of be-
coming avowed and overt postmodern theorists, the Justices
are more apt to use postmodern insights, such as anti-
foundationalism, as if they were modernist tools like stare deci-
sis, to facilitate the satisfactory resolution of cases. To be sure,
this instrumental use of postmodern insights can lead to accu-
sations that the Justices are being merely disingenuous or in-
authentic rather than truly postmodern. Scalia, for instance,
certainly is open to this potential charge. On one hand, as I
have emphasized, Scalia on numerous occasions has acknowl-
edged the Court's power to use precedents selectively and
manipulatively. 153 On the other hand, he has also repeatedly
proposed formalistic mechanisms that would supposedly van-
quish judicial discretion.154 In other words, Scalia seeks
mechanisms to defeat a judicial flexibility that he realizes is
indefatigable.
More important, perhaps, one might further argue that
there exists an inherent tension between postmodern theory
and judicial decision-making. Since legal scholars can cele-
brate multiple textual meanings while Supreme Court Justices
cannot, one might conclude that even if legal scholarship has
become postmodern, the practices of law and judicial decision-
making never can do so. Accordingly, there must be an insu-
perable limit to the idea of postmodern jurisprudence. 55 To
some extent this observation might partially explain the appar-
ently growing gap between legal scholars and judges. In fact, if
their respective structural roles in American society lead them
in opposite directions, particularly in reaction to postmodern
culture, then this gap is likely to become a long-lasting and un-
bridgeable abyss. Whereas modernist jurisprudents for dec-
ades tended to dwell on judicial opinions, postmodernist juris-
prudents will continue to pay less and less attention to judges
and their opinions. And judges, including Supreme Court Jus-
153. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
154. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997);
Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991 (1994) (emphasizing Scalia's advocacy of formalistic
approaches).
155. Cf. Post, supra note 147, at 396 ("There is no postmodern law, al-
though there are postmodern commentaries on law.").
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tices, will react by continuing either to ignore or disdain the
outpourings of legal scholars.15 6
Nevertheless, one should not too readily dismiss a more
postmodern understanding of the Supreme Court. If one views
postmodernism at least partly as a matter of culture, then as I
have argued, certain Supreme Court actions can be understood
precisely as manifestations of postmodern culture in judicial
practice. Supreme Court Justices, from this viewpoint, are no
more disingenuous or inauthentic than they are overtly and in-
tentionally postmodern; rather, they act as Justices enmeshed,
for better or worse, within postmodern culture. Because they
are apt to appropriate postmodern insights in an instrumental
manner, as tools, however, the Justices will depict a rather odd
picture of postmodernism. Few postmodern theorists would
maintain that deconstruction implies a textual free-for-all
where "anything goes."' 57 Deconstruction instead explicates
how one comes to understand a text and how that process en-
tails certain conditions or limits.158 Yet, from the Supreme
Court's viewpoint, postmodernism might look precisely like a
license for unconstrained textual interpretation.159
This point becomes clearer when viewed in a political light.
The manifestation of postmodern themes in the politically con-
servative jurisprudence of Rehnquist and Scalia suggests that
postmodernism is, to a great degree, politically ambivalent.
Many postmodern legal theorists stress, and rightly so, that
postmodernism, especially deconstruction, has potentially radi-
cal political implications. 60 This radical capacity is evident in
156. See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 64 (arguing that law professors and
Justices became estranged in the mid-1970s); Balkin, supra note 10, at 1967
(emphasizing distance between Court and scholars); Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (emphasizing a disjunction between law professors
and judges; written by a federal judge); Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra
note 8, at 1098-1102 (discussing different orientations of Justices and legal
academics toward postmodernism). For examples of Supreme Court Justices
denigrating the legal academy, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-
69 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
157. See JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION 110 (1982); Madeleine
Plasencia, Who's Afraid of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References in
Judicial Opinions, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 247 (1997); see also CULLER,
supra, at 131-34, 280.
158. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE
L.J. 743, 760-63 (1987); Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 185-92.
159. See Plasencia, supra note 157, at 246-47.
160. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
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the writings of outsider jurisprudents who emphasize that all
textual meanings are unstable and shifting-that there always
are multiple voices and multiple truths. Derrida goes so far as
to equate deconstruction with justice. 161 Progressive or left-
leaning postmodern theorists thus often seek to intervene in es-
tablished social and cultural practices through deconstruction
by disturbing and shifting the accepted social structures and
cultural symbols.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's postmodernism il-
lustrates that despite its potentially radical political implica-
tions, postmodernism can be turned to conservative ends.
From Rehnquist and Scalia's vantage, postmodern culture ap-
pears to mean, indeed, that anything goes. They recognize that
their judicial decisions cannot be objectively grounded on firm
foundations, yet they still must decide the cases. The lack of
foundations thus seems to do little more for Rehnquist and
Scalia than to justify following their conservative political in-
clinations. And what else should they do, they might ask, if
there are no modernist foundations-no legal constraints-
nothing ostensibly to force or at least to pressure them to go in
different political and legal directions? As Scalia laments: "[A]
rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular,
identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all."162 Even so, unlike
their estranged associates in legal academe, the Justices cannot
celebrate the undecidability of textual meaning because, as the
Justices might sneer, they are just too busy deciding real
cases.
16 3
Yet, regardless of the specific political inclinations of the
Supreme Court Justices, and regardless of their unusual social
position vis-A-vis thoroughgoing postmodern theorists, the Jus-
tices' situation epitomizes the postmodern condition in at least
one important way. Postmodern cultural studies often describe
the postmodern subject or agent as somewhat like a modernist
self in hyperspeed. The culturally and socially constructed
postmodern subject is one who constantly makes inane deci-
Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990).
161. See id. at 945 ("Deconstruction is justice.").
162. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989), quoted in Se-
gall, supra note 154, at 1015.
163. To be clear, if Supreme Court Justices were to become thoroughgoing
postmodern theorists-which, as I have discussed, is highly unlikely-they
would recognize more clearly that all textual interpretation is always con-
strained. For an explanation of the process of textual interpretation, see
Feldman, Politics, supra note 8, at 169-84.
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sions or choices without firm (modernist) reasons or founda-
tions in a quest for individual distinction. Which brand of jeans
should I wear? Which type of soda should I drink? Which tele-
vision channel should I jump to next? And next, and next... ?
Which store in the mall should I shop in next, and next, and
next... ? Which microwavable dinner should I choose? Which
breakfast cereal? Which cup of South American java?
Bizarrely, in the postmodern era, one seeks personal unique-
ness by relentlessly choosing from a variety of mass-produced
and mass-advertised products that ostensibly cater to those
who are radically different. The fragmentation of American
culture has mixed with capitalist commercialism to commodify
radicalism. The postmodern subject is, most succinctly, a hy-
perconsumer, for whom "spending is a duty-perhaps the most
important of duties."164 From this perspective, Supreme Court
Justices are prototypical postmodern subjects. The Justices
(qua Justices) may not be hyperconsumers, but they are hyper-
decision-makers. They must decide and decide and decide some
more-their role in American society is to decide cases as well
as deciding whether to grant certiorari for numerous other
cases. The Court disposed of nearly seven thousand cases
during the 1997 term.165 Yet they must make their decisions
without the benefit of belief in a firm modernist foundation,
without the reassuring comfort of objectivity.
And as with Dumbo the elephant, the Justices must and
will continue to fly, though now they must do so without their
magic feather.
164. BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 50; see id. at 201-03 (discussing the post-
modern agent or subject). With regard to the question of systemic structures
of power, I follow feminists such as Rita Felski and Nancy Fraser who argue
for understanding power from multiple perspectives or as operating on multi-
ple axes. See FELSKI, supra note 3, at 32; FRASER, supra note 7, at 10.
165. See Leading Cases, Table II(A), 112 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1998).
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